Astronomers define black holes as parts of space where even light disappears without a trace. History also has many holes. These are not only dark periods about which little information has survived.
In the case of Ukrainian history, there are important periods from which the events have been deliberately concealed or distorted. One such piece of our history lasted a full four centuries. It started with the devastation of Kyivan Rus during the Mongol invasion in the first half of the 13th century and ended with the war of liberation waged by Ukrainian Cossacks under Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky in the mid-17th century.
The Baltic Connection
In Soviet schools, we were taught that after the Mongol's destruction of East Slavic principalities (modern-day Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine), reconstruction and rebirth were spearheaded by the principality of Moscow, whose influence grew to encompass the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union. Thus, the ancient history of Ukraine (what scholars now call Kyivan Rus) was stolen by modern Russia.
In fact, the situation in this part of the world at that time was more multilateral, and the outcome, now well known, was much less inevitable. During a trip to the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius during Soviet times, I was greatly surprised to discover a lot of old Ukrainian words in a Russian-Lithuanian phrase-book that I had purchased to help me get around.
I suddenly realized that the ties between my Slavic ancestors and their Baltic neighbors to the northwest were greater than I had been taught in school.
This common heritage was rooted in a huge state that existed during the black-hole period and stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea, including much of modern-day Ukraine. While Moscow princes were still paying tribute to the Khans, Lithuanians were fighting them back across the steppe.
A warlike and pagan people, Lithuanians accepted Christianity (officially at least) in 1386, when the country created a confederation with Poland through a royal marriage.
The Mongols had destroyed dozens of kingdoms and empires throughout the 1200s, but didn't touch Lithuania, which was strong enough to expand against the splintered Muslim Tatar Khanates that remained, as well as against continuing pressure from the Roman Catholic Teutonic and Livonia knights (who took much of Estonia and Latvia).
Belarus and Ukraine west of the Dnieper fell under Baltic influence more often through diplomacy than battles. In 1569, Poland and Lithuania further integrated into a union. While in the thirteenth century, most cultural influence on Lithuania was Teutonic, by the 16th century, Polish culture and language dominated.
The Baltic-based empire also included several ethnic groups, some of them Muslim.
After Russia became the dominant power in the region, these facts were concealed or overlooked as insignificant, especially during Soviet times. Even modern textbooks briefly describe this period simply as an epoch of feudal wars. However, a more careful examination reveals lots of interesting and edifying details, which make it clear why this part of Ukrainian history disappeared into a black hole.
Between Teutons and Tatars
There were, of course, ties among the scattered principalities between the Baltic and Black seas before the Mongol invasion, but they were deepened when nobles and even commoners began to abandon their homes and move north to avoid the Khan's cavalry raids.
These people ended up settling in what came to be known as the Great Lithuanian Principality (a name that was used in the confederation and union alike). When Moscovia, a fraction of its current size at the time, did get stronger, it began to expand eastward in the direction of the Volga and Siberia, which, like eastern Ukraine, were also populated by Muslim Tatars.
The influx of Slavic refugees into Lithuanian lands accelerated the principality's development and intensified resistance to the Catholic knights from the west. German advancement east was effectively halted in the 15th century, not to resume for another four hundred years.
This movement of Ukrainians, or Rus as they called themselves back then, toward the Baltic sphere of influence was not an expansion but an escape. Lithuania became its protector against the Khans, who demanded tribute in both goods and people.
Moreover, the principality was as tolerant to Orthodox Christians as it was to Catholics - possibly because the Lithuanians themselves were still largely steeped in pagan traditions. Muslims living there were also not persecuted. In addition, the Kyivan nobility, which had been exposed to the much more sophisticated Byzantine law, writing, and culture, only enriched the Lithuanian-Polish state. Old Ukrainian, along with Polish, penetrated into everyday speech, which is why its traces can still be found in modern Lithuanian.
Moreover, the peaceful coexistence and absence of religious or national conflict facilitated the intermarriage of ethnic groups.
The genealogy of some Lithuanian princes can be traced to ancient Ukrainians and vice versa. To this day, nationalists in Belarus look back at the medieval Lithuanian state as part of their own ethnic heritage.
Unfortunately, during WWII, much of the native Belarusian population was killed by German forces, only to be replaced by post-War Russian migration. The policies of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka have been yet another reversal in the revival of the Belarusian national identity.
Non-violent confluence of Balts and Rus augmented the power of both in the Great Lithuanian Principality. In 1320, eighty years after the total destruction of Kyiv by the Mongols and their Tatar proxies, Lithuanian and Ukrainian forces successively defeated the cavalry of the local khan in three battles, ending tribute payments to the east.
This was a full 60 years before the famous battle of Kulikovska under Moscow grand prince Dmitry Donskoy, which is remembered as the beginning of the end of Tatar-Mongol rule in Russia.
The Lesson of Intolerance
Some scholars call the period of Rus-Lithuanian cooperation one of the best that the people living there ever knew. As evidence, they cite the absence of significant social disturbances or revolts against the ruling elite. This might also explain why the period was censored by the Soviets. The lasting peace would contradict not only popular Russian history but Soviet dogma. For years, we were taught that our history was one of social struggle by the working class against exploiters from the West and East.
Rus-Lithuanian cooperation also gave the Great Lithuanian Principality a respected place in Europe and eventually stimulated friendly relations with its western neighbors. The Poles, however, benefited from this friendship the most. The union was one of equals, and it remained as such for a long time. Poland strengthened its borders, expanded its territory, and increased its influence in southeastern Europe.
Every new Polish king would confirm the conditions of the treaty of equals. The Pact of the Convenant stated that "nothing old is to be destroyed, nothing new to be introduced." However, the temptation to be more dominant in the relationship was too much for the Poles to resist. After all, the Poles had joined Europe and Christianity much earlier. The result of the temptation was rebellions by petty princes and constant struggles for power, rank, land, and privileges. On the other hand, these difficulties were restricted to the aristocrats and did not affect the lives of commoners much.
All this changed when the Catholic Church began to encroach upon Orthodoxy. The attempt to spread the Catholic faith met with fierce resistance from various social classes and, of course, the clergy. The critical point was the establishment of the union in 1569. Following the loss of much of northern Europe to Protestantism during the Reformation, the Pope was determined to keep the remaining Catholic states as such. Sporadic uprisings grew into a powerful and continuous resistance.
The most devastating rebellion was headed by Severyn Nalyvayko, who is still considered a Ukrainian national hero. Polish officials could not extinguish the fire of the revolt in Ukraine. It was the beginning of the end of the Polish state. Ukrainian Cossacks, a powerful military force, appeared on the frontier with the eastern Khans. Endeavors to suppress or bribe them failed. The Cossacks grew into a self-sufficient and self-managed force, defending Orthodox Christian principles and values. In 1648, they became the nucleus of the army headed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, who led his people to throw off the Polish yoke.
Renewed Relations
Almost four centuries have passed since the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Union in the 17th century. But mutual feelings of goodwill and friendliness between these two nations and Ukraine continue to this day. In the Soviet era, numerous visiting Lithuanian tourists expressed sincere interest in Ukrainian history and culture. And I remember how, unlike guests from Moscow, Ukrainians were always given warm receptions in Lithuania. More recently, these relations have taken on a diplomatic dimension.
Poland and Lithuania have been the most vocal advocates of Kyiv's European integration bid, and both played decisive roles as arbiters during the recent Orange Revolution. Everything from increasing trade to frequent and top-level exchanges now marks ties between the three neighbors, which, as four hundred years ago, are moving closer as equal partners for the mutual benefit of their populations.
— Written by Volodymyr Senchenko for The Ukrainian Observer (a defunct news site), republished here for archival purposes.
